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A B S T R A C T
This paper contributes to understanding national variations in using low-carbon electricity sources by
comparing the evolution of nuclear, wind and solar power in Germany and Japan. It develops and applies a
framework for analyzing low-carbon electricity transitions based on interplay of techno-economic, political and
socio-technical processes. We explain why in the 1970s–1980s, the energy paths of the two countries were
remarkably similar, but since the 1990s Germany has become a leader in renewables while phasing out nuclear
energy, whereas Japan has deployed less renewables while becoming a leader in nuclear power. We link these
diﬀerences to the faster growth of electricity demand and energy insecurity in Japan, the easier diﬀusion of
onshore wind power technology and the weakening of the nuclear power regime induced by stagnation and
competition from coal and renewables in Germany. We show how these changes involve the interplay of ﬁve
distinct mechanisms which may also play a role in other energy transitions.
1. Introduction
Though internationally comparative analyses of energy transitions
remain rare (Geels et al., 2016), they are necessary for understanding
variation in the use of low-carbon electricity across countries (Lipp,
2007; Schneider et al., 2011), which in turn is important for governing
energy transitions required to mitigate climate change (GEA, 2012).
Since contemporary energy transitions are driven by political goals,
approaches for their analysis should come not only from economic and
technology history (Fouquet, 2010; Kander et al., 2013) but also from
political economy.
Political economy of energy dates back to the 1970s and 1980s
when scholars sought to answer why nations responded diﬀerently to
the oil shocks (Hughes and Lipscy, 2013; Keohane, 1984). In a seminal
piece from that era, Ikenberry (1986) pointed out that in the 1960s-
1980s Germany and Japan pursued a similar energy policy of
‘competitive accelerated adjustment’: they expanded nuclear power,
restructured industries, and promoted eﬃciency to counteract insecu-
rities of oil supplies. However, in the 1990s, their energy paths
diverged. While Germany expanded wind and solar and is phasing
out nuclear power, Japan deployed much smaller amounts of renew-
ables but became a world leader in nuclear power.1 The classic theories
do not explain these diverging energy paths and should be revisited to
better account for contemporary energy transitions (Hancock and
Vivoda, 2014; Hughes and Lipscy, 2013).
The divergence of Germany's and Japan's energy paths is more than
a theoretical problem. In recent years, there have been numerous calls
on Japan (and other countries) to learn from Germany's energy policies
(Hake et al., 2015; Huenteler et al., 2012; Lovins, 2014; Nature News,
2013). Yet, such calls only make sense if we understand the reasons for
the original divergence. In this paper we compare and explain the
diﬀerence in the use of nuclear, solar and wind power in Germany and
Japan in order to contribute to a theory and policy of sustainable
energy transitions.
The starting point for our analysis is the same as it was for
Ikenberry: analyzing 'the way in which … problems were deﬁned
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and … the policy responses perceived as possible' (1986, 105).
However, we do not assume that the two countries faced the same
problems. Such an assumption was valid in the 1970s when the risk of
oil embargoes and price volatility was the energy problem that all
industrial countries tried to solve (Katzenstein, 1977). We show that
since the 1980s the challenge of secure electricity supply has become
increasingly diﬀerent for Germany and Japan. We also show how the
capacity of the two states to introduce (or discontinue) energy
technologies was inﬂuenced by the dynamics of socio-technical re-
gimes. Therefore, our analysis relies on three distinct ﬁelds of knowl-
edge: political science, energy systems analysis, and socio-technical
transition studies.
2. Existing theories and analytical framework
A comparative study of energy transition should start with justify-
ing the case selection and the scope of analysis with respect to the
technologies and time period covered. Though some existing studies
(Hermwille, 2016; Huenteler et al., 2012; Strunz, 2014) focus only on
post-Fukushima period when the German government declared
Energiewende an oﬃcial policy and Japan changed its nuclear plans,
other literature (see Hake et al., 2015; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006)
points out that the changes in Germany can be traced back to the
1970s. We agree with the latter observation and thus compare
transitions in both countries starting from 1970. However, such a long
time period includes many entangled change processes presenting a
methodological challenge.
To overcome this challenge, we use the ‘comparable case – most
similar system’ study design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970) where the
cases are diﬀerent on a dependent variable and similar on as many
explanatory variables as possible. Germany and Japan have advanced
market economies, lack of domestic oil and gas reserves, and a similar
history of post-war reconstruction. These overarching similarities make
it easier to pinpoint diﬀerences that could explain variations in energy
transitions. Further in line with this design, we compare the use of
speciﬁc technologies – nuclear, wind and solar power2 – between the
two countries. This makes it possible to take the diﬀerences between
technologies out of the equation and concentrate on the diﬀerences
between countries.
2.1. Existing theories
While only a few papers (Feldhoﬀ, 2014; Hermwille, 2016;
Huenteler et al., 2012; Lovins, 2014) speciﬁcally compare Germany
and Japan, more general literature oﬀers many explanations of low-
carbon energy transitions. A common starting point is that diﬀerences
in transitions result from diﬀerences in national energy policies. For
example, Lovins (2014) argues that Japan does not expand renewable
electricity fast enough because ‘its leaders […]worship old policies that
retard wide use of [renewable] energy sources’ (see Huenteler et al.
(2012) for a similar view). Such arguments lead Jacobsson and Lauber
(2006, p. 257) to ask: “Why do … some countries choose policies which
apparently are superior in terms of inducing transformation whereas
other countries choose policies which work less well?”. This question
invokes others: what do countries seek to achieve with their energy
policies? Are countries free to choose their energy policies? Do energy
policies reﬂect common national or special interests? Do energy
policies always work as intended and if not, why? The remainder of
this sub-section explains how the existing literature addresses these
questions.
2.1.1. Secure supply-demand balance and other state goals
An inﬂuential body of political science literature views states3 as
relatively autonomous actors that adopt policies in order to achieve
their speciﬁc goals, such as internal order, external independence, or
economic growth (Dryzek et al., 2002; Skocpol, 1979). One of the main
energy policy goals is what Helm (2002) formulated as balancing
demand with secure supply. Others pointed out that ‘secure’ often
meant ‘domestic’ (Yergin, 1988). The history of state-backed nuclear
power is a good illustration. For example, Nelson and Sprecher (2008)
linked the use of nuclear power to lack of domestic coal reserves, and
Fuhrmann (2012) and Gourley and Stulberg (2013) – to energy import
dependence, while Jewell (2011) observed that periods of rapid
electricity demand growth preceded the launch of national nuclear
power programs.
Ikenberry (1986) described how both Germany and Japan sought to
reduce their dependence on oil imports. More recently, governments of
both countries used projections of demand growth and targets of
energy self-suﬃciency in formulating their energy strategies:
Germany's 2010 Energiekonzept (Knaut et al., 2016) and Japan's
2010 Basic Energy Plan (BEP) (Duﬃeld and Woodall, 2011). Germany,
with its large coal reserves, has been less concerned about importing
fuels for electricity generation. In contrast, Japan always connected
energy self-suﬃciency with national security (Atsumi, 2007), some-
thing that Calder (2008) called Japan's “energy angst”. Suzuki (2014)
and Price (1990) linked these energy security concerns to the fast
development of nuclear power in Japan and Feldhoﬀ (2014) further
explained this development by the isolation of Japan's electric grid (in
contrast to Germany which can trade electricity with its neighbors).
These theories explain faster expansion of nuclear power in Japan in
the 1990s, but not why nuclear power was growing similarly fast in
both countries in the 1970s–1980s or why Germany initiated a nuclear
phase-out in the early 2000s. More importantly, they do not explain
why it was the coal-rich Germany4 and not the coal-poor Japan that
more actively developed domestic renewables?
States can, of course, act on concerns other than energy security.
For example, Joas et al. (2016) identify 14 diverse goals of
Energiewende supported by German political elites and dominated
by climate change mitigation, a goal also frequently mentioned by other
authors (Duﬃeld and Woodall, 2011; IRENA, 2015a; Jacobsson and
Lauber, 2006; Lauber and Mez, 2004). The climate imperative cannot
explain the diﬀerence between Germany and Japan. Although climate-
related arguments have been used in both countries to support nuclear
power, renewables or both, there is no evidence that commitment to
climate mitigation has been higher in either country5 and, more
importantly, climate concerns cannot explain the policy focus on either
nuclear or renewables as both are low-carbon options. There are also
no obvious reasons why other state goals (employment, economic
growth, technology leadership etc.) would diﬀer between Germany and
Japan.
2.1.2. Vested interests
Energy policies may be shaped not only by autonomous goals of the
state but also by special interests of particular social groups (Hall,
1993). For example, pro-nuclear interests may have promoted nuclear
power and suppressed renewables in Japan (Huenteler et al., 2012;
Kingston, 2013; Valentine and Sovacool, 2009). In contrast, a pro-
2 We exclude other low-carbon electricity sources because these either did not change
much (hydro power), followed comparable trajectories in both countries (waste and
biomass), or have not been signiﬁcant (geothermal power) (Figure SM-1).
3 In this paper we refer to ‘the state’ as state bureaucracy rather than ‘a nation’ (which
includes all citizens).
4 According to Laird and Stefes (2009), the diﬀerence in fossil fuel endowments cannot
explain faster deployment of renewables in Germany compared to the US. Keller (2010)
disagreed with this argument.
5 According to Pew Research Center (2009, 2015), in 2009 65% of Japanese
considered global warming as a very serious problem and 64% were prepared to protect
the environment even if it slows growth and costs jobs, whereas in Germany the relevant
numbers were 60% and 77%. In 2015, 42% of Japanese and 34% of Germans considered
global climate change as a very serious threat.
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renewables coalition supported wind and solar while pushing for the
nuclear phase-out in Germany (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Lauber
and Jacobsson, 2016; Mez and Piening, 2002). This narrative cannot
fully explain why the pro-nuclear interests suppressed wind, but not
solar in Japan and why the pro-renewables coalition defeated nuclear
but not coal in Germany. Moe (2011) answers the ﬁrst question by
identifying a ‘solar (but not wind) lobby’ in Japan. But if solar and wind
had separate interests in Japan, what made them cooperate in
Germany? Furthermore, whom did solar and wind compete against?
Was there a monolithic ‘conventional fossils-nuclear lobby’ (Strunz,
2014) or did coal miners, gas importers, electric utilities, and manu-
facturers of nuclear equipment pursue somewhat separate interests? If
such interests were aligned in the 1970s, and the 1980s, what made
them diverge later? Have they inﬂuenced the state policies all the time
or only in certain periods?
2.1.3. Anti-nuclear sentiments and other ideas and social movements
Many political scientists argue that a state's policies can be aﬀected
by ideas advocated by broad social movements and capable of shifting
‘policy paradigms’, i.e. fundamental patterns of how states deﬁne
problems and search for solutions (Hall, 1993; Kern et al., 2014).
From this angle, anti-nuclear sentiments could be the main driver of
Germany's Energiewende (Hake et al., 2015; Mez and Piening, 2002;
Schreurs, 2012). Such ideas clearly played a role in Germany, but
cannot convincingly explain its diﬀerence with Japan where anti-
nuclear sentiments have also been strong both pre- and post-
Fukushima6 (Valentine, 2010; Aldrich, 2012; Feldhoﬀ, 2014). This
lack of systematic comparison also relates to other public attitudes used
to explain energy transitions, such as the ‘environmentalist tradition’ in
Germany (Geels et al., 2016) and ‘national prestige’ in Japan (Valentine
and Sovacool, 2009). More importantly, comparing the eﬀects of public
sentiments on energy transitions is methodologically diﬃcult because
the causality between public opinion, state-backed ideologies, and
energy system change is diﬃcult to establish (Laird and Stefes,
2009), as is the eﬀectiveness of any public opposition in altering
government or investment decisions.7
2.1.4. State capacities and institutions
The state's ability to achieve its goals may be constrained by
material or institutional factors. For example, Jewell (2011) observed
that civil nuclear power is primarily deployed in large, rich and
politically-stable countries. Burke (2010) showed that more advanced
energy technologies are used in countries with higher GDP per capita
and lower resource endowments (the ‘electricity ladder’). Csereklyei
et al. (2016) show that per capita energy use ‘converges’ for countries
with similar economic development, a long-term pattern that would
hinder demand management policies.
Ikenberry (1986) argued that states choose their energy strategies
depending on their patterns of industry-state interaction, what he
called ‘institutional capacity’. In his view, similar institutional capa-
cities explained why Germany's and Japan's energy strategies were
alike in the 1970s–1980s. Recently, Geels et al. (2016) used a similar
institutional argument to explain the diﬀerence in energy transitions in
Germany and the UK by the fact that the former is a ‘coordinated
market economy’ and the latter – a ‘liberal market economy’ (Hall and
Soskice, 2001). Other institutional explanations of Energiewende in
Germany stress federalism, a multi-party political system and a strong
civil society (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Schreurs, 2012). Accounts
of energy in Japan, in contrast, stress centralization, technocratic
governance (Lovins, 2014; Moe, 2011; Valentine and Sovacool,
2009), and even a 'clientelist' state (Feldhoﬀ, 2014), ‘homogenous
policy culture ﬁxated on sub-optimal strategy’, and a one-party reign
controlling public discourse (Valentine, 2010, 6851).
Yet state capacities and institutions cannot fully explain the
diﬀerence between Germany and Japan. Both are large, wealthy and
politically stable countries with ‘alliance capitalism’ (Lauber and Mez,
2004; Shonﬁeld, 1968) or ‘coordinated market economy’ (Hall and
Soskice, 2001) featuring close state-industry interaction. If anything,
this explains the similarities in the 1970s–1980s but there is no
systematic account of whether there was a subsequent divergence
and if so what was its exact role in energy transitions.
2.1.5. States and socio-technical regimes
To implement its energy goals, states must interact with other social
actors (industry, banks, utilities, end users etc.). In particular, a state
may choose to work with already established (‘incumbent’) actors or try
to foster new ones (‘newcomers’).8 Incumbents may have suﬃcient
resources to help the state reach its goals, but they are also capable of
strongly resisting needed change. This is because they are organized in
socio-technical regimes, complex heterogeneous systems which include
both technical artefacts and human actors, and are stable, resilient and
capable of self-reproduction potentially leading to technological lock-in
(Geels, 2014; Kemp, 1994).
As part of their self-reproduction, incumbent regimes may coopt
state institutions and alter or reinterpret the state goals to their own
advantage (i.e. act as vested interests). Geels (2014) describes such
strategies of the coal and nuclear industry in the UK and Leung et al.
(2014) show how the oil regime aﬀects national energy policy in China
through 'securitizing' energy supply chains. In Germany, the nuclear
power regime exerted signiﬁcant political inﬂuence in the 1970s-1980s
(Mez, 2002) and the coal regime – in the 1950s-2000s (Frondel et al.,
2007; Pahle, 2010; Storchmann, 2005). Several scholars (e.g. Kingston
(2013) and DeWit and Kaneko (2011)) have described the so-called
‘nuclear village’ in Japan, which according to Hermwille (2016)
"comprises of government, businesses and political institutions (parti-
cularly – the Liberal Democratic Party, LDP)".
The ability of a regime to either deliver on a state's goals or else re-
interpret these goals to its own advantage depends not only on state
capacities and motivations but also on resources and coordination of
the regimes (Smith et al., 2005). Can these characteristics explain why
the nuclear (but not the coal) regime collapsed in Germany (but not in
Japan) during the 2000s, given that in the 1980s the nuclear regimes
were similarly strong in both countries and the coal regime was
stronger in Germany?
2.1.6. States, innovation and technology diﬀusion
In striving towards their energy goals states may seek to introduce
new energy technologies which often means replacing or at least
reconﬁguring existing socio-technical regimes. Although potentially
more eﬀective, this strategy is also more risky. Innovations emerge and
take initial hold in ‘niches’ protected from incumbents (Geels, 2002;
Raven et al., 2015). The state can play a role in this process by
nurturing protected niches through research, development and de-
monstration (RD&D) funding, and other strategies (Smith et al., 2005;
Smith and Raven, 2012). However, adoption of new technologies does
6 Joas et al. (2016) point out that the last systematic study of energy-related values in
Germany (Keeney et al., 1987) is almost 30 years old. The only comparative (and very
general) study of public narratives by Hermwille (2016) relates to the post-Fukushima
period when anti-nuclear sentiments were similarly strong in both countries and resulted
in even more drastic adjustment of nuclear plans in Japan (see Section 3.2).
7 In Germany, the peak of anti-nuclear protests was in the 1970s, when they stopped
construction of an NPP in 1974 and fuel cycle facilities in the 1980s (Mez and Piening,
2002). But it was before the bulk of the NPPs was constructed. The extension of the
lifetime of NPPs in 2010 triggered national demonstrations, but the opposition was “not
overwhelming” (Schreurs, 2012, 35). In Japan, anti-nuclear protests prevented siting
over one-half of its planned nuclear reactors (Aldrich, 2012). In a related observation,
Pahle (2010) writes that “public protest proved little eﬀective to hamper new coal plants
[in Germany], which otherwise had broad political support” (p.3441)
8 A detailed description of states’ strategies to inﬂuence socio-technical regimes is
provided by Smith et al. (2005) and Smith and Raven (2012).
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not entirely depend on a particular state's eﬀorts. Technologies usually
emerge in ‘core’ countries from which they diﬀuse to ‘periphery’
nations (Grubler et al., 1999; Raven et al., 2015) depending on many
non-policy factors (Breukers and Wolsink, 2007; Gossens et al., 2015).
Technology diﬀusion and innovation played a signiﬁcant role in
Germany and Japan. Both had some of the world's highest public
energy RD&D spending and pioneering research and demonstration
schemes. Both countries were early adopters of nuclear power from the
US (Poneman, 1982) and Germany adopted wind power from Denmark
in the 1990s (Heymann, 1998; Klaassen et al., 2005). Mizuno (2014)
explains socio-technical obstacles facing wind power and Kurokawa
and Ikki (2001) describe much more successful development of solar in
Japan, the global frontrunner in solar power in the 1980s–2000s. Yet,
it is less well-studied how and why these niche developments aﬀected
large-scale diﬀerences in the use of nuclear, wind and solar power. For
example, why did wind power not take oﬀ in Japan and why did solar
power develop faster in Germany in the 2000s when Japan was the
world's technology leader?
2.1.7. Regime shifts
Energy transitions may involve complex processes known as
‘regime shifts’ when incumbent socio-technical regimes give space to
newcomers emerging from previously protected niches. Regime shifts
have been extensively analyzed, particularly within the multi-level
perspective (MLP),9 a prominent ontological framework connecting
regime shifts to pressures from both niches and wider ‘landscapes’ (e.g.
state policies) (Geels, 2002; Raven et al., 2015).
There are several accounts of regime shifts from conventional to
renewable sources in Germany starting with Jacobsson and Lauber
(2006). Strunz (2014) views post-Fukushima developments in
Germany as a shift from the “conventional fossil-nuclear energy
regime” to “a new RES-regime”. Geels et al. (2016) compare transition
pathways in Germany and the UK. In particular, they point to the role
of Germany's strong manufacturing sector in its shift to renewables.
However, the existing literature oﬀers no systematic explanation of why
such regime shifts did not occur in Japan which also has an impressive
manufacturing sector that could have potentially beneﬁted from
producing wind turbines and other renewable energy equipment.
2.2. Analytical framework, method and data
Our analytical framework is constructed to elaborate and combine
the insights from the literature described in the previous section with
respect to electricity transitions in Germany and Japan (Fig. 1,
Table 1).
First, we address the extent to which the state's energy strategies
were driven by autonomous state goals (1) vs. vested interests (2). We
are particularly interested in the states’ goals related to secure supply-
demand balance or energy security. We deﬁne energy security as ‘low
vulnerability of vital energy systems’ (Cherp and Jewell, 2014). Our
assumption is that both states considered their electricity generation
and relevant international markets as ‘vital energy systems’. Another
assumption is that the states viewed vulnerabilities from three distinct
perspectives (Cherp and Jewell, 2011): sovereignty (i.e. maximum
national control over energy systems), robustness (i.e. low risks from
such predictable threats as resource depletion, aging of infrastructure
and demand growth), and resilience (i.e. the ability of vital energy
systems to respond to disruptions). This approach makes our analysis
more detailed and speciﬁc than in the previous literature. For example,
instead of measuring primary energy import dependency we analyze
self-suﬃciency of sources used speciﬁcally for electricity generation
and also consider growth of electricity demand, aging of infrastructure
and developments in international energy markets.
We trace two types of state's strategies: working with incumbent
regimes (3) and nurturing protected niches (6). With respect to
incumbent regimes, we focus on two further processes: (4) how
socio-technical regimes seek self-reproduction through vested political
interests, and (5) how their strengths are aﬀected by the type of energy
resources (domestic vs imported) as well as by construction, operation
and aging of related technical infrastructure. Since coal has played a
key role in electricity generation, we analyze the coal regime as well as
nuclear and renewables regimes and related political interests.
With respect to protected niches, we analyze the impact of both
state's strategies (6) and international technology diﬀusion (7). We are
particularly interested in the process by which a niche becomes a
ﬂedging regime capable of self-reproduction (including through poli-
tical inﬂuence) and competition with other regimes (8).
Our analytical framework does not cover all processes potentially
important for energy transitions (Table 1). For example, we do not
analyze climate commitments and state capacities both of which are
similar in Germany and Japan, or the role of ideas and social move-
ments, and institutional and social change which can accompany
energy transitions. Our aim is to explain the observed diﬀerence with
the limited set of mechanisms shown in Fig. 1, leaving space for other
mechanisms to provide complementary or alternative explanations.
Our analytical framework is the foundation for exploring the two
cases by ‘structured focused comparison … [i.e.] using a set of …
theoretical propositions to structure an empirical inquiry’ (Levy, 2008,
p. 2). We provide four parallel historical accounts for the evolution of
electricity systems in general (Section 3.1) and of nuclear, wind and
solar power speciﬁcally (Sections 3.2–3.4) starting from 1970 and
including plans up to 2030. We use energy statistics from the IEA,
IRENA and the IAEA, scholarly literature as well as government,
corporate and media documents in English, German and Japanese as
our data sources as documented in the Results section.
3. Results
3.1. Electricity supply, demand and overarching state strategies
Fig. 2 shows the evolution of electricity generation in Germany and
Japan between 1970 and 2013 as well as plans and scenarios for 2030
(see also Table 2, Table SM-1). One obvious diﬀerence is the faster
growth of electricity demand in Japan. In 1970, the two countries
Fig. 1. Analytical framework: processes in the focus of the comparative analysis.Notes: 1
– state ‘autonomously’ reacting to threats to secure supply-demand balance; 2 – state
responding to pressures from vested interests; 3 – state working with incumbents; 4 –
socio-technical regimes seeking reproduction through vested political interests; 5 –
socio-technical regimes interacting with energy infrastructure; 6 – states working with
protected niches; 7 – diﬀusion of technological innovation; 8 – niche becoming a regime
capable of self-reproduction and competition with other regimes.
9 Socio-technical scholars also use 'resilience framework' (Strunz, 2014), Strategic
Action Fields (Schmid et al., 2016) and other social theories explaining regime shifts in
addition to or instead of the MLP.
A. Cherp et al. Energy Policy 101 (2017) 612–628
615
had similar electricity consumption (though per capita it was much
lower in Japan), but by 2010, Japan used almost 80% more electricity
than Germany. In the 1970s and the 1980s, electricity demand grew in
both countries, but in the 1990s it stagnated in Germany while
continuing to grow in Japan. What was the reason for faster consump-
tion growth in Japan: diﬀerence in industrial structure, life styles,
energy eﬃciency, or other factors?
To begin with, the growth of electricity consumption was almost
entirely limited to the residential, commercial, and public services
(RCP) sector; whereas non-RCP (transport, industry and agriculture)
consumption has remained stable and similar between the two
countries (Figure SM-2). The total energy consumption in the RCP
sector per capita in Germany has been the highest among EU-G7
countries and relatively stable. In contrast, RCP energy consumption in
Japan increased from the lowest among G7 countries in the 1970s to
the levels of Italy, France and the UK in 2013, with electricity
responsible for most of this growth (Figure SM-3). Thus, the higher
electricity consumption in Japan was a consequence of (1) convergence
of per capita total energy use (see Csereklyei et al. (2016)) and (2)
preference to electricity in Japan and to other forms of energy (e.g.
natural gas) in Germany (Fig. 3).
Electricity supply in both countries has been dominated by fossil
fuels, but with an important diﬀerence: these were primarily domestic
in Germany and almost entirely imported in Japan (Fig. 2). Therefore
electricity self-suﬃciency of the two countries has been dramatically
diﬀerent. In Germany, 75–90% of electricity was generated using
domestic sources,10 compared to 20–45% in Japan (Figure SM-4).
The main reason for Germany's high self-suﬃciency has been the
abundance of domestic coal. Germany has world's 7th largest coal
reserves (US EIA, 2011), was the third largest coal producer until
1989 (IEA, 2015d), and remains by far the largest producer of lignite
(WCA, 2014). Coal was crucial for Germany's post-war restoration and
the welfare of several regions (Jungjohann and Morris, 2014). In the
1960s, the coal industry employed up to 600,000 people, in the early
Table 1
Existing theories, focus and limitations of the study.
Theories in existing literature Comparative focus of this study Out of scope of this study
States pursue their ‘autonomous’ goals, in particular secure supply-
demand balance
Vulnerability of electricity supply in terms of self-sufficiency, aging of
infrastructure, and demand growth
State goals other than energy
securitya
State policies are aﬀected by vested interests and social movements Connection of vested interests to socio-technical regimes, their
comparative strengths, coalitions, and impact on policy choices
Effects of social movements and
public opinion
States may pursue diﬀerent strategies but are constrained by their
material and institutional capacities
Strategies pursued by states, in particular working with incumbents
and nurturing protected niches
Material and institutional
capacitiesb
Socio-technical regimes are stable and capable of self-reproduction
including through aﬀecting state policies
Strength, resources and coordination of socio-technical regimes
related to coal, nuclear, wind and solar power. Connection of socio-
technical regimes to vested political interests
Discursive strategies of socio-
technical regimes e.g.
‘securitization’
Innovations emerge and take hold in protected niches. Innovations
can also diﬀuse from abroad. Success in niche innovation/
technology diﬀusion may overturn incumbent regimes
Niche innovation in low-carbon technologies. Diffusion of
innovations from abroad. Evolution of niches into regimes capable of
self-reproduction and competition with other regimes
Nuclear power niche innovations
before 1970c
a Climate mitigation does not explain the choice between low-carbon options such as nuclear and renewables; public opinion about climate change is similar in both countries.
b Literature indicates similar material and institutional capacities of Germany and Japan.
c Except general facts.
Fig. 2. Electricity mix in Germany and Japan, 1970–2013 and projections for 2030.Notes: The bars to the right of the vertical lines depict plans and scenarios for 2030. * – domestic
supply = domestic production + net imports for Germany and strictly equals domestic production in Japan. Sources: 1970-2013 data: IEA (2015a). For Germany, Ref-2014 is the
reference scenario from Schlesinger et al. (2014) based on the current policies and SIIA-2010 is the SIIA scenario from Schlesinger et al. (2010) which formed the basis for the Energy
Concept 2010 (Bundesregierung, 2010). For Japan, S1-2012 is the post-Fukushima scenario from Japan's Ministry of the Environment (2012) and EXResearch Institute et al. (2011);
BEP-2010 is based on the Basic Energy Plan (BEP) of 2010 (Duﬃeld and Woodall, 2011; METI, 2010); INDC-2015 is derived from INDC of Japan (Government of Japan, 2015).
Aggregation into categories of sources by the authors.
10 For the purposes of this paper we assign nuclear to domestic sources. More
accurately, it is ‘quasi-domestic’ because not all elements of the fuel cycle (e.g. uranium
mining and fuel reprocessing) are located within the country.
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2000s – close to 70,000 (Frondel et al., 2007; Storchmann, 2005). Since
the late 1940s, the German government justiﬁed its support to domestic
coal extraction and use by economic and energy security arguments
(Frondel et al., 2007; Lubell, 1961). The main political voice for coal
interests has been the SPD11, a major political party. Since 1980, coal
has received over €150 bln in subsidies (Frondel et al., 2007), reaching
over €7 bln/year in the mid-1990s (Ecofys, 2014; Küchler and Wronski,
2015; Storchmann, 2005).12 In contrast in Japan, domestic coal was
hardly used for electricity generation after 1970 and coal extraction had
become negligible by 2000. Coal mining jobs declined from 122,820 in
1963 to 4,651 in 1990, 1,336 in 2000, and 600 in 2007 (Kunitomo,
2009, p. 5). By the 2000s, there were no mining unions or coal-
dependent regions that would seek political support.
Other than the diﬀerence related to coal, energy policies of both
countries were by and large similar in the 1970s and the 1980s and
included industrial restructuring to reduce energy intensity (Ikenberry,
1986) as well as extensive RD&D spending on nuclear, fossil and
‘alternative’ energy as well as energy eﬃciency. The successful intro-
duction of nuclear power was more important for Japan, where it
signiﬁcantly improved its otherwise low self-suﬃciency ratio, than for
Germany, where it had a small eﬀect on its already relatively high self-
suﬃciency (Figure SM-4, Fig. 2).13
In the 1970s, West Germany started ‘pipes for gas’ deals with the
USSR and in the 1980s natural gas deliveries increased substantially
(Stern, 2005) as the oil prices went down. At that time, Germany's
energy RD&D spending started to decline, a trend that continued until
the early 2000s (Figure SM-5). In the 1990s, with continuously low
prices and improved access to Eurasian hydrocarbons resulting from
the end of the Cold War, energy security concerns decreased further
and there was less justiﬁcation for the hard coal subsidies though they
will not be fully removed until 2018.
Japan's energy security concerns have been graver than Germany's
Table 2
Electricity production and trade in Germany and Japan in 2010 and 2030 (plans and projections), TWh.
Source Germany Japan
2010a 2030 2010a 2030
Referenceb SIIA 2010c INDCd BEP 2010e S1-2012f S2-2012f
Nuclear 141 (23%) 0 84 (17%) 288 (26%) 213–234 (20–22%) 537 (53%) 0 150 (15%)
Coal 274 (44%) 249 (41%) 102 (21%) 299 (27%) 277 (26%) 113 (11%) 232 (23%) 220 (22%)
Wind 38 (6%) 143 (23%) 137 (28%) 4 (0.4%) 18 (2%) 18 (2%) 90 (9%) 66 (7%)
Solar 12 (2%) 67 (11%) 36 (7%) 4 (0.4%) 75 (7%) 57 (6%) 72 (7%) 67 (7%)
Other RE 41 (7%) 59 (10%) 49 (10%) 39 (4%) 55 (5%) 32 (3%) 68 (7%) 57 (6%)
Hydro 20 (3%) 19 (3%) 26 (5%) 82 (7%) 96 (9%) 107 (10%) 120 (12%) 110 (11%)
Other fossils 99 (16%) 73 (12%) 52 (11%) 392 (35%) 320 (30%) 156 (15%) 418 (42%) 330 (33%)
Total production 626 611 485 1109 1065 1020 1000 1000
Net imports* −15 −53 19 – – – – –
Total domestic supply 611 558 504 1109 1065 1020 1000 1000
Notes: Percentages indicate share in the domestic electricity production; negative values for net imports are exports of electricity;* – negative values indicate exports. See Table SM-1 in
supplementary materials for additional data.
Sources: a IEA (2015a), b Schlesinger et al. (2014), c Scenario IIA from Schlesinger et al. (2010), d METI (2014a) and Government of Japan (2015), e Basic Energy Plan (BEP) 2010 from
METI (2010), METI (2014b), f Japan’s Ministry of Environment (2012), EX Research Institute et al. (2011), and Tsukamoto (2012)
Fig. 3. Energy consumption per capita by ﬁnal form of energy in the residential, commercial and public sector in Germany and Japan, 1970–2013.
Source: IEA (2015a), calculations by the authors.Notes:Germany has been using more residential energy per capita than Japan, but a higher proportion of this energy has been in the
form of coal and subsequently natural gas as well as heat and biomass.
11 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016), Social
Democratic Party.
12 The coal subsidies were regulated by the so called Jahrhundertvertrag which
assured that until 1995 a speciﬁed quantity of domestic hard coal was purchased for
electricity generation at a price equal to the domestic extraction cost to be used in
electricity generation (Welsch, 1998, p. 204). Since the mid-1990s this subsidy was
reduced and the share of cheaper imported hard coal has been increasing. Hard coal
mining is projected to end in 2018, but the use of both hard coal and lignite in electricity
generation will likely continue almost undiminished until 2030 (Table 2, Fig. 4). The
most recent attempt at curbing coal use through introducing a levy on the most polluting
lignite power plants was aborted after backlash from the coal industry and unions
(Vasagar, 2015).
13 Nuclear power made up only about half of domestic electricity sources in Germany,
most of the rest being coal with expandable production. In contrast, in Japan, nuclear
power accounted for three-quarters of domestic sources, the rest being hydro-power,
whose potential was almost fully tapped out (IEA, International Energy Agency, 2008, p.
122), Figure SM-4.
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not only because of the scarcity of domestic coal. Japan has an isolated
and fragmented electricity grid14 whereas Germany has a single grid
well-connected to the European electricity market15 and in addition
can rely on its neighbor countries for emergency gas supplies
(European Commission, 2014). Secondly, starting from the 1990s
Japan grew concerned with global and Asian energy markets, in part
due to China's switch from being an oil exporter to the world's largest
oil importer, along with its growing appetite for coal and natural gas
imports.16 Third, Japan's tragic experience of the Second World War
associated with energy supply issues made a strong imprint on national
energy policy priorities (Sagan, 1988; Suzuki, 2014). Nuclear power
oﬀered an alternative and allowed Japan to diversify away from these
persistent energy security concerns.
Reﬂecting these concerns, Japan's energy-related RD&D spending
consistently increased from the 1970s until the 2000s (Bointner, 2014).
In 1980, Japan passed the pioneering Alternative Energy Act which
supported solar and other ‘alternative’ energy through ﬁnancial,
technical, and regulatory measures. Prior to the adoption of the Act,
Hamakawa (1979) argued that solar energy is needed to face the
‘prospective future energy crisis’ to which Japan is especially vulner-
able due to its extremely high rate of demand growth (p. 444). Japan's
other energy security policies included diversiﬁcation of supply away
from Middle Eastern oil (including to Australian coal and gas),
acquisition of overseas energy assets, and ‘energy diplomacy’ in Asia
(Atsumi, 2007; Toichi, 2003).
In 2010, both countries adopted comprehensive and somewhat
similar energy plans for the next two decades. In Germany, the
Energiekonzept aimed to reduce the use of coal by 2.7 times and
increase non-hydro renewables by 2.4 times. In Japan, the 3rd Basic
Energy Plan (BEP) proposed to reduce the use of fossils by 2.5 times
and almost triple non-hydro renewables. Both plans also envisioned a
larger role for nuclear power: in Germany, the Energiekonzept
proposed extension of life-time of NPPs and in Japan the BEP
proposed to double nuclear power output (Bundesregierung, 2010;
Duﬃeld and Woodall, 2011, Fig. 4, Fig. 5). The rationales for these
plans cited both climate and energy security considerations. The
Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 changed both plans in a similar
way: the targets for renewables were practically unchanged while
nuclear plans were signiﬁcantly downscaled: Germany essentially
reversed to its nuclear phase-out schedule established in 200217 and
Japan more or less cancelled its plans for new nuclear power plants
construction (see Section 3.2 for detail). Naturally, this meant that the
share of fossil fuels in the electricity mixed projected for 2030 has
dramatically increased – Table 2, Fig. 4 (Cherp and Jewell, 2016;
Knaut et al., 2016; Government of Japan, 2015; METI, 2014).
3.2. Nuclear power
The history of nuclear power in both Germany and Japan dates
back to the 1960s when both states worked with the US (and in the case
of Japan – UK) manufacturers and local industries and utilities to build
their ﬁrst commercial reactors (Poneman, 1982; Smith and Rose, 1987,
1989). Deployment of nuclear power required public RD&D spending,
ﬁnancial, and political support, which was hastened by the 1970s oil
crises (Mez and Piening, 2002; Suzuki, 2014). This support was not
without political opposition, especially after the Chernobyl accident in
1986 (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Schreurs, 2012; Aldrich, 2012;
Feldhoﬀ, 2014; Valentine, 2010). This, however, did not have practical
consequences for new reactor connections18 whose output peaked in
Germany in the 1990s contributing 29% of electricity supply and
reaching 27% in Japan (Fig. 2, Fig. 5).
In the 1990s, Germany did not formally change its nuclear power
policy, but did not connect any new NPPs to the grid19 and continued
reducing its public RD&D energy spending (a large part of which was
for nuclear energy, Figure SM-5). Without new reactor builds, domestic
nuclear equipment manufacturers sought contracts abroad and non-
nuclear opportunities including in the nascent wind turbine industry.
Siemens, which was involved in the construction of all German nuclear
reactors, sold its reactor business to French Framatome in 200120 and
in 2011 announced the end of its nuclear activities (BBC, 2011). In
contrast, Japan built 15 new reactors and increased state support for
nuclear power. In addition to large and stable RD&D funding, the
Japanese government overpowered local resistance to nuclear power
(Feldhoﬀ, 2014) through increasing monetary support to siting NPPs
from about ¥10 bln JPY/year in the mid-1970s to ¥120–180 bln/year
in the 1990s-2000s, with the majority of the funds being allocated to
host communities (Suzuki, 2014, see Table SM-2).
In the 2000s, nuclear power policies of the two countries further
diverged as a result of decisions by the German ‘red-green’ coalition
government of the SPD and the Greens (1998–2002). Though the
Greens were in the Parliament since 1983, it was only during this
period that they could achieve their ultimate political goal: the end to
nuclear power (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Schreurs, 2012). Why did
the other coalition partner, the SPD, agree to support this goal? SPD
had been traditionally linked to pro-coal interests and was represented
by several pro-coal politicians in the red-green government (Lauber
and Jacobsson, 2016; Lauber and Mez, 2004). The tension between the
coal and nuclear agendas, competing for base-load power, started
already in the 1970s21, but it clearly intensiﬁed in the 1990s when SPD
started supporting a nuclear phase-out (Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016).
During that time stagnating demand and falling electricity prices did
not allow for simultaneous expansion of coal and nuclear, especially if
wind and solar were to grow as well. Moreover, nuclear power was cast
as ‘climate-friendly’ (in comparison to coal), the Jahrhundertvertrag22
expired in 1995 and cheap coal imports combined with international
energy markets liberalization threatened the main trump cards of
domestic coal: energy security and jobs (Welsch, 1998). By 2002, the
Greens and the SPD negotiated a law (Atomgesetz, 2002) prohibiting
construction of new NPPs and limiting the lifetime of existing reactors
to 32 years on average.
This decision was a clear loss for electric utilities which owned
14 Japan's national grid consists of 10 largely isolated grids, which operate on diﬀerent
frequencies in the East and the West (FEPC, 2013).
15 This also allows Germany to balance intermittent electricity from wind and solar by
exporting or importing electricity, the possibility that does not exist in Japan (see Fig. 2
and Table 2).
16 China also mimicked Japan's strategy of acquiring overseas fossil fuel assets (Leung
et al., 2014) which sometimes put the two countries in direct competition with each other
(Atsumi, 2007).
17 However, as a whole the 2010 Energiekonzept was not updated and thus the 2010
GHG reduction target for 2030 is likely to be missed unless new policy measures are
adopted. In the reference scenario where nuclear power is phased out by 2022, the output
of solar and wind will be some 18% higher than in the 2010 Energy Concept, the output
of natural gas some 50% higher, and the output of coal-ﬁred power plants some 140%
higher (Schlesinger et al., 2010,2014), (Fig. 4, Table 2)
18 The German government successfully argued that the Chernobyl accident resulted
from unsafe Soviet reactor design, which prompted the shut-down of ﬁve East German
reactors of the same design during the uniﬁcation, but did not aﬀect the ‘safe’ West
German plants (Schreurs, 2014). In Japan, the safety concerns following Chernobyl were
counteracted by a similar narrative (Nakano, 2011).
19 In 1989–1990 in the process of German reuniﬁcation, ﬁve smaller nuclear reactors
of Soviet RBMK design in Eastern Germany were disconnected. One of them operated
only for three weeks in 1989 (IAEA, 2015; WNA, 2015a).
20 Subsequently it established a joint venture between its “conventional island”
business (i.e. hi-tech components of NPPs which are not part of the ‘nuclear island’
(fuel rods and reactors) and thus include pressurised vessels, turbines, safety systems
etc.) and Framatome's successor AREVA to participate in a problematic construction of a
reactor in Finland, then dissolved this partnership, to consider a deal with Russian
Rosatom which was eventually cancelled as well.
21 According to Mez and Piening (2002) the nuclear sector in the 1960s insisted on
subsidies similar to coal, and electric utilities resisted surcharges on using domestic coal
(Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006, p.265).
22 See footnote 12.
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NPPs (Mez and Piening, 2002), but barely damaged nuclear manufac-
turers who by that time had largely left the sector. And it was a huge
win for coal. Not only did the output of coal-based electricity remain
stable, but coal power industry also received the biggest investment
since post-war reconstruction (Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016, p. 159),
amounting to almost 15% of the standing capacity and triggered by
both projected capacity deﬁcit due to the nuclear phase-out and by
strong political support (Pahle, 2010). Between 1997 and 2003, coal
subsidies, totaling around €35 bln, only decreased slightly
(Storchmann, 2005, p. 1491). In 2003, a decision to continue support
for mining until 2012 was made (Bosman, 2012, p. 8), and coal was
exempted from the ‘eco-tax’ which was imposed on other fossil fuels
(Lauber and Mez, 2004, p. 608). Furthermore, in negotiating SPD's
support for renewables, the Greens agreed to higher taxes on natural
gas which kept coal competitive (Bechberger, 2015, p. 33).
Tensions between coal and nuclear power in Germany continued
through the late 2000s when a broad political coalition negotiated the
Energiekonzept adopted in 2010 (Bundesregierung, 2010). It envi-
sioned slashing the use of coal in electricity and extending the lifetime
of seven NPPs by 8 years and of the remaining ten by 14 years (Table 1
and Fig. 4) (Atomgesetz, 2010). One year later, following the
Fukushima accident in 2011, the government returned to the pre-
viously agreed phase-out timeline (Atomgesetz, 2011). Since 2003,
Germany has stopped nine reactors with plans to decommission the
remaining nine by 2022 .23
The developments were diﬀerent in Japan. Its nuclear sector did
not face political competition from strong coal or renewables interests;
its powerful supporters included not only electric utilities but also
Fig. 4. Nuclear, coal and renewables (excluding hydro) in electricity production in Germany and Japan in 2010 and in plans for 2030.
Sources: IEA (2015a) for 2010; for Japan, BEP-2010 is based on Duﬃeld and Woodall ( 2011); METI (2010); INDC-2015 is based on Government of Japan (2015). For Germany, Ref-
2014 is the reference scenario from Schlesinger et al. (2014) based on the current policies and SIIA-2010 is the SIIA scenario from Schlesinger et al. (2010) which formed the basis for
the Energy Concept 2010 (Bundesregierung, 2010).
Fig. 5. Installed nuclear power capacity in Germany and Japan by cohort of nuclear power reactors and the capacity of reactors 25 years old and younger, 1970–2030.
Sources and notes: Reactors are assigned to a cohort depending on the year they enter commercial operation. Capacity for a given year accounts for all reactors in operation on the last
day of the year including all reactors in temporary shutdowns, but not permanently retired reactors. The age of a reactor in a given year is calculated based on the year of connection to
the grid and rounded up to the nearest year. IAEA (2015) is used for 1970–2015 data in both countries. For Germany: projections (bars) are based on WNA (2015a) referring to
Atomgesetz (2011); 2002 plan shows own calculations based on 32 years of service according to Atomgesetz (2002); 2010 plan shows retirement according to Atomgesetz (2010). For
Japan: projections for decommissioning are according to Takahashi (2015) and own calculations based on projected 40 years of service including ﬁnishing the construction of the
reactors at Shimane-3 (1325 MWe, originally planned commissioning in 2016) and Ohma (1325 MWe, originally planned commissioning 2022) (scenario S2-2012 in Table 1); the
vertical line shows the capacity bracket required to meet the INDC's (Government of Japan, 2015) target for 2030: the lower end corresponds to 20% share of nuclear power with the
capacity factor of 80%; the upper boundary corresponds to 22% share of nuclear power with the capacity factor of 70%.
23 All decommissioned reactors have been or will be between 31 and 36 years old. The
Krümmel reactor built in 1983 was stopped ﬁrst in 2007 and then in 2009 for safety
reasons (IAEA, 2015). Despite the drama of closing seven reactors in 2011 immediately
following Fukushima, they all ﬁt this age pattern and the shut-down schedule agreed in
2002 (Fig. 5).
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equipment manufacturers; it commanded many more jobs than in
Germany (Table SM-3); and it had the energy self-suﬃciency argument
ﬁrmly on its side. In the 2000s, Japan constructed ﬁve more reactors,
though the share of nuclear power in its electricity declined to 26%24 by
2010. It expanded its nuclear R &D spending to twice the size of all
other OECD countries combined25 and achieved the largest knowledge
stock in nuclear power, at least 15 times larger than Germany's
(Bointner, 2014). Toshiba, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Hitachi
have all acquired nuclear manufacturing capacities overseas.26 Besides
these industrial giants, Japan's $15 bln nuclear market involved about
10,000 companies, including more than 400 with dedicated nuclear
technologies, and provided jobs to 80,000 people in 2010 (Mitsui
Knowledge Industry, 2013). Japan's nuclear business has also been
active globally: Japan helped build reactors in South Korea and has
recently signed cooperation agreements with Turkey, U.A.E., Jordan,
and Vietnam, among others (AIF, 2014; Jewell and Ates, 2015).27
Japan's New National Energy Strategy (METI, 2006b) and the 2010
BEP (METI, 2010) aimed to increase the role of nuclear power. The
2010 BEP cited climate concerns and energy security as the rationale
that “the government itself will continue taking the lead in the further
development of nuclear energy”. It aimed to increase the share of
nuclear power to 53% of total electricity production in 2030 by
constructing 14 additional reactors (Duﬃeld and Woodall, 2011,
Fig. 4, Table 2). After the Fukushima nuclear accident, this plan was
cancelled and several other scenarios for the future of nuclear power
were proposed. The 2014 BEP (METI, 2014a) also communicated in
Japan's INDC (Government of Japan, 2015) is for nuclear power to
contribute 20–22% of electricity in 2030. This goal would require that
either new reactors are constructed and/or some of the existing get
their licenses extended beyond the statutory 40 years28 (Fig. 5). In fact,
as of October 2016, three rectors (Takahama-1, Takahama-2, and
Mihama-3) have been approved by the Nuclear Regulation Authority of
Japan to operate beyond this limit for additional 20 years (NRA, 2016).
3.3. Wind power
Similar to nuclear, wind power technology matured outside of both
Germany and Japan. It was commercialized during the 1980s in
Denmark (Quitzow et al., 2016), which remains a global leader in the
technology (Bointner, 2014). Germany supported research into wind
power in the 1970s and 80s, but it failed to produce a commercially
viable design and abandoned the project (Heymann, 1998; Klaassen
et al., 2005; Lauber and Mez, 2004). In 1990, Germany passed a Feed-
in-law (StrEG) (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, 1990) backed by the ‘un-
likely coalition’ (Laird and Stefes, 2009) of the Greens, liberal-
conservatives and the SPD. The StrEG was primarily intended to
beneﬁt small hydro-power plant owners by requiring utilities to buy
electricity at 90% of retail prices, but unexpectedly led to an ‘unim-
aginable’ 100-fold increase in wind power in the 1990s (reaching about
1% of the total electricity generation by 1999) (Jacobsson and Lauber,
2006; Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016). This explosive growth of wind
power in Germany in the 1990s was initially based on Danish
technology (Heymann, 1998; Klaassen et al., 2005).29
Following this expansion, many German manufacturers, including
Siemens, entered the market and by the early 2000s the German wind
turbine industry had become the second largest in the world
(Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006, p. 267; Siemens, 2015); the number of
jobs in the wind industry was comparable to, if not larger than, in the
stagnating nuclear power industry without any new manufacturing
(Table SM-3). Germany established the world's second largest knowl-
edge stock on wind energy after the U.S. (Bointner, 2014). Additionally,
individual citizens and cooperatives invested extensively in wind
energy installations.30
Thus, over the 1990s, wind power in Germany evolved from a
protected niche to a ﬂedging regime which started to compete with
existing regimes and gained political inﬂuence. Political battles over the
StrEG began in the second half of the 1990s, when the law was
challenged in courts by electric utilities (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006).
These battles intensiﬁed as low electricity prices around 2000 made the
position of all electricity actors, including the nascent wind manufac-
turing industry, more precarious (Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016, p.150).
The pro-wind coalition allied with the ‘red-green’ government not only
managed to defend support for wind, but also succeeded in replacing
the StrEG with a much stronger law on renewable energy, EEG (EEG,
2000). The EEG established a guaranteed (for 20 years) feed-in-tariﬀs
(FIT) for wind and solar PV (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). As a result,
Germany installed 3.5 times more wind in the 2000s than in the 1990s
(Fig. 6). The 2010 Energiekonzept envisioned that onshore and
oﬀshore wind output would increase 3.5 times and supply over 28%
of electricity by 2030 (Table 2, Fig. 4). The 2014 EEG re-aﬃrmed this
commitment but set a ceiling on the maximum capacity of renewables
(Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016).
In contrast to Germany, Japan did not support research in wind
energy in the 1970s or 1980s (Mizuno, 2014; Moe, 2011). Technical
conditions for wind in Japan are more challenging than in Germany or
Denmark, where wind power ﬁrst took oﬀ. Mizuno (2014) and
Ushiyama (1999) document a lack of viable turbine designs suitable
for Japan's strong turbulent winds, lighting strikes, and high seismi-
city. Lu et al. (2009) estimates the technical potential of onshore wind
in Japan as about 6 times smaller than in Germany and IRENA (2012)
and IEA (2015b) assess the cost of a wind farm in Japan as signiﬁcantly
larger than in other countries (see also Mizuno (2014, p.1011)). The
areas with the largest onshore wind potential are far from Japan's
electricity consumption centers and transmission and balancing is
complicated due to the national grid fragmentation and island topo-
graphy. Finally, it has been diﬃcult to site wind turbines due to siting
and construction rules made more stringent after a series of accidents
(Mizuno, 2014).
Nevertheless in the 1990s, Japan introduced technical and ﬁscal
measures, regulations and voluntary commitments supporting wind
power (Mizuno, 2014), which were similar to Germany's31 but did not
24 This was due to the overall growth in electricity production and to the temporary
shut-downs responding to accidents and safety concerns e.g. following the scandal at the
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) in 2002–2003 and suspension of several NPPs
in 2007 after the Chuetsu Oﬀshore Earthquake (Suzuki, 2014).
25 This R &D is spearheaded by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency with its 4400
employees at ten facilities and an annual budget of $US 1.7 bln (WNA, 2015b).
26 In 2006, Toshiba acquired Westinghouse, the world largest nuclear reactor
manufacturer, which ironically built the ﬁrst nuclear power plants in both Germany
and Japan in the 1970s. In 2007, Hitachi formed a joint venture with General Electric,
another world leader in reactor manufacturing (METI, 2006a). Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries has closely cooperated with AREVA, a global leader in nuclear industry.
27 Japan also viewed nuclear energy cooperation as a way to reduce energy-related
tensions in Asia (Toichi, 2003).
28 If all reactors are strictly decommissioned at 40 years, Japan will have less than
15% of electricity generated from nuclear power in 2030 (Scenario 2012-S2 in Table 1
based on (Takahashi, 2015)). One possible pathway of achieving the current government
goals involves completing construction of two reactors which were under construction in
2011 (Ohma and Shimane-3) and extending the licenses of 9–12 the reactors beyond 40
years. Another possible alternative, not mentioned in the current policies, is constructing
a few new reactors while strictly adhering to the retirement schedule. Other proposed
policies include the 2012 post-Fukushima policy of completely phasing out nuclear
power by 2030 (which would mean retiring NPPs constructed after 1990 at the average
age of 33.6 years).
29 Since the early 1990s, Vestas installed over 7000 turbines with a total capacity over
10GW in Germany, its second largest market after the US (Vestas Wind Systems AS,
2014).
30 According to Morris and Pehnt (2015) about 46% of solar and wind installations in
2012 were owned by some 1.4 mln citizens and their cooperatives (including through
indirect investment). Borchert (2015) estimates the number of direct and indirect owners
at between 1 and 2 million in 2010.
31 IThe rates in the voluntarycommitments at ca JPY 11.2/11 US cents per kWh were
similar to the FIT rates used in Germany in the same period of ca DM 0.17/9.5 US cents
per kWh (Table 1 in Lauber and Mez (2004) and Mizuno (2014) p. 1002)
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result in similar developments. Danish Vestas installed their ﬁrst
commercial wind turbines in Japan in the mid-1990s but the market
did not grow as it did in Germany, the US and elsewhere.32 By 2001,
foreign ﬁrms (German Siemens and Enercon, Dutch Lagerwey and
Danish Vestas) had provided some 95% of wind turbines in Japan
(Mizuno, 2014).33 Without becoming a mature regime, the wind power
sector did not have political inﬂuence to trigger a policy similar to
Germany's EEG and it was not clear whether such a policy would give
similar results in Japan. The gap in wind deployment between Japan
and Germany has continued to grow (Fig. 6, Figure SM-7). Japan's
planned wind power deployment for 2030 is 4.5 times larger than in
2010, but still less than half of Germany's capacity today (Table 2) .34
3.4. Solar power
Solar PV power technology was promoted in both countries since
the 1970s through public RD&D funding (Figure SM-6), and pilot
programs such as Germany's ‘Solar Roofs’ programs (Jacobsson and
Lauber, 2006) and Japan's Sunshine program started in 1974 and
expanded in 1980 with the Alternative Energy Act (Kimura and
Suzuki, 2006; Kurokawa and Ikki, 2001). It was Japan rather than
Germany that ﬁrst became the global solar PV leader. In the 1990s, the
Japanese electronics industry – in particular Sharp, Sanyo and Kyocera
(Moe, 2010) – had the world's largest share of PV panels manufactur-
ing and installations (IEA, 2014). During the 1990s, the use of solar PV
was still at a low level, but increased in both countries with Japan
installing 6–7 times larger capacity than Germany (Fig. 6). In a report
prepared for the US Government by Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory in the early 2000s Japan was named as the world leader
in solar power policies, from which the US had much to learn (Wiser
et al., 2002).
However, the 2000 EEG changed the situation by providing very
high FITs for solar power in Germany. The rate of solar installations in
Germany increased while in Japan it remained the same and in the
mid-2000s Germany overtook Japan in both installations and manu-
facturing of solar PV panels (IEA, 2014). The 2010 Energiekonzept in
Germany envisioned tripling of solar power output by 2030 and the
BEP in Japan planned for an estimated 15–20 times increase in solar
power in the same time period (Table 2, Fig. 4). After 2012, R &D for
renewables in Japan increased (Figure SM6; Bointner, 2014) and the
renewable support policies were strengthened. Subsequently the rate of
solar PV installations increased in Japan and slowed in Germany so
that the gap between the two countries has reduced and will most likely
close in the near future35 (Fig. 6, Fig. SM-7). According to the current
(2014) plans, the output of solar power will be similar in both countries
by 2030 (Table 2). Japan remains the global knowledge leader in this
technology, followed by Germany and the US (Bointner, 2014, p. 739).
3.5. Summary
The evolution of nuclear, wind and solar power in Germany and
Japan is summarized in Table 3 with the diﬀerences and similarities
explained in the next section.
4. Discussion
This section describes ﬁve mechanisms, which can explain the
observed diﬀerences and similarities in electricity transitions in
Germany and Japan. The mechanisms are shown in Fig. 7, which is
an expanded version of Fig. 1 from the analytical framework (Section
2.2) (see also Table 4).
4.1. A. States working with incumbents for secure supply-demand
balance
Both states worked with incumbents to increase domestic supply,
constrain demand, or otherwise reduce the vulnerability of energy
systems. This mechanism explains Germany's continuous support for
domestic coal, both countries’ eﬀorts to reduce energy intensity36 and
their support for nuclear energy in the 1980s. It also explains why in
the 1990s Japan, which faced rapidly rising demand and a worsening
energy security outlook, continued to support nuclear energy much
more intensely than Germany, which had stagnating demand and
Fig. 6. Installed capacity of solar PV and wind power in Germany and Japan, 1990–2015.
Sources: IRENA (2015b) for 2014 and 2015; IEA (2015c) for all other data.
32 The latest Vestas installation in Japan was in 2008 (Vestas Wind Systems AS,
2015).
33 Japanese companies, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, and Japan Steel Works (JSW) started to
play a role by 2010 and 2011 (Mizuno, 2014).
34 Proponents of wind power have made more proposals for wind expansion which are
more ambitious and more similar to German plans (JWPA, Japan Wind Power
Association, 2014, 2015; Ministry of the Environment of the Government of Japan,
2012; Mitsui Research Institute, 2015).
35 In 2015, Japan added 9–10GW and reached 33.3GW of solar PV capacity and
Germany added 1–2GW and reached 39.6GW. By 2020 Germany is projected to have
50.5GW and Japan 59.3GW (IEA, 2015b, pp. 46, 59).
36 Demand reduction strategy was hardly feasible in Japan in the 1990s when it faced
convergence of per capita use of energy in the RCP sector with other G7 countries and
would need to constrain residential consumption to a level much lower than in them (see
Section 3.1) against the global trends (Csereklyei et al., 2016).
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optimistic energy security outlook.37 This ﬁts Helm's (2002) observa-
tion that “governments have always intervened for security-of-supply
reasons, although their enthusiasm depends on the supply-demand
balance” (174). Demand growth and deployment of nuclear power
correlated in the 1970s–2000s (Fig. 8)38 in both countries. In
particular, in the 1990s, Japan experienced a similar growth in
electricity demand and connected the same number of new nuclear
units to the grid as in the 1980s. At the same time, Germany
experiencing a more optimistic energy security outlook reduced its
energy RD&D spending and did not construct any new plants.
4.2. B. Regimes gaining and losing strengths from energy resources
and infrastructure dynamics
The strengths of socio-technical regimes depended on energy
resources and infrastructure which they exploited, constructed, and
operated. Electricity regimes were stronger when they were (a) based
on domestic rather than imported sources or (b) involved new
construction rather than merely operation of existing infrastructure.
Regimes based on domestic fuels more easily mobilize the ‘energy
security’ argument to their advantage but also involve more actors and
interests connected to fuel extraction (Table SM-3). This explains why
the coal regime has been stronger and more inﬂuential in Germany
than in Japan.
Expanding regimes, where many new facilities are installed, involve
not only operators and owners but also equipment manufacturers,
installers and the construction sector. When no new infrastructure is
constructed, manufacturers may distance themselves from owners and
operators. In the early 2000s, the nuclear regime in Japan was a large
and growing industry with extensive supply chains and global leader-
Table 3
Differences in the evolution of nuclear, wind and solar power in Germany and Japan in 1970s–2000s and its context.
Fig. 7. Explanatory mechanisms for electricity transitions in Germany and Japan.Notes:
Each mechanism is designated by a speciﬁc color and letter. A – states working with
incumbents for secure supply-demand balance; B – regimes gaining/losing strengths
from energy resources and infrastructure dynamics; C – regimes’ self-reproduction
through vested political interests; D – states nurturing niches as a parallel strategy; E –
cross-border technology diﬀusion and niche innovation.
37 Until the end of the 1990s the absolute majority of NPPs in both countries was
under 25 years (Fig. 5). thus aging did not aﬀect political decisions in this period
although it started to matter in the 2000s.
38 This analysis generates a hypothesis, of a broader correlation between electricity
demand growth and nuclear expansion, which is in line with Fouquet's and Pearson's
more general observation of demand growth usually accompanying past energy transi-
(footnote continued)
tions (Fouquet and Pearson, 2012). This would expand Jewell's (2011) ﬁnding of a link
between demand growth and the start of national nuclear power programs. It also echoes
Fuhrmann's (2012) ﬁnding that countries are more likely to build nuclear power plants
during times of high economic growth. However, Japan did not have fast economic
growth during the 1990s even though it constructed new NPPs. Thus it is electricity
demand growth rather than economic growth which may be of more signiﬁcance for
nuclear expansion.
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ship, promising employment and exports in addition to energy self-
suﬃciency (Table SM-3, Fig. SM-4). In Germany, the manufacturers
were looking for opportunities elsewhere and it was primarily the
utilities which fought to proﬁt from already existing plants.39 Naturally,
it was easier to legislate nuclear phase-out in the latter case of a weak
and fragmented regime.
In the same time period, the situation was the reverse for renew-
ables. The wind regime in Germany was much stronger because it
involved owners, manufacturers and installers of wind farms.
Subsequently, the solar regime gained strength with the increased rate
of manufacturing and installation and it recently weakened when
manufacturing moved from Germany to Asia (Lauber and Jacobsson,
2016). The strength of a regime aﬀects its ability to shape state policies
in its own favor as described in the next sub-section.
Table 4
Explanatory mechanisms for transition processes in Germany and Japan.
Country and period Transition processes Mechanisms
Nuclear power
Germany and Japan 1970s Fast uptake D: state support to niche technology in response to oil crises and demand growth
E: nuclear niche becomes a regime
Germany and Japan 1980s Expansion A: state working with incumbent in response to oil crises and demand growth
Japan 1990s-2000s Expansion A: state working with incumbent to ensure secure supply-demand balance in response to
demand growth and worsening energy security outlook
B: nuclear regime strengthened based on vigorous growth
C: emergence of the ‘nuclear village’ further supporting pro-nuclear policies
Germany 1990s Stagnation A: declining interest in energy security due to low prices and optimistic outlook
B: lack of new orders results in manufacturers’ searching for opportunities elsewhere; nuclear
regime weakened and fragmented
Germany 2000s Nuclear phase-out C: a coalition of pro-renewables and pro-coal interests defeats weakened and fragmented
nuclear regime
Wind power
Germany 1970s-1980s Niche developments, negligible
uptake
D: state supports niche technology in response to energy security concerns
Japan 1990s-2000s
Germany 1990s Rapid uptake E: wind power diffuses from Denmark. Wind niche becomes a fledging regime
Germany 2000s Expansion C: pro-wind interests advocate for strongly supportive FITs (EEG, 2000)
Solar power
Germany and Japan 1970s-1990s,
Japan 2000s
Niche developments slow uptake D: state supports niche technology in response to energy security concerns
Germany 2000s Rapid uptake C: pro-renewables/wind interests advocate for strongly supportive FIT (EEG, 2000)
E: solar niche becomes a ﬂedging regime
Note: For letters designating diﬀerent mechanisms see Fig. 7.
Fig. 8. Changes in annual electricity consumption, nuclear power capacity and non-hydro renewables output by decade, 1970–2010.
Sources and notes: For 1970–2030, the bars show the change in ﬁnal electricity consumption and non-hydro renewables (IEA, 2015a) as well as the net change in the installed nuclear
capacity (IAEA, 2015) in a given decade. For 2030, the bars show the same values calculated by the authors based on Schlesinger et al. (2014) Reference scenario for Germany and INDC
(Government of Japan, 2015) for Japan. The chart illustrates the correlation between the growth in electricity construction and construction of new NPPs in 1970s-1990s and in the
2000s in Japan. The decline in nuclear capacity in Germany since the 2000s and in Japan after 2011 is partially compensated by an increase in non-hydro renewables.
39 The split between the interests of utilities and manufacturers was not unique to
Germany. Nakata (2002) noted that electric power utilities are ‘conservative about future
investments in nuclear power stations in Japan’ (p. 364).
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4.3. C. Regimes self-reproducing through vested political interests
A state's ‘autonomous’ pursuit of its goals cannot explain why it was
Germany and not Japan that boosted renewables and started nuclear
phase-out in the early 2000s. Both developments occurred when
demand growth in Germany was sluggish, the energy security outlook
positive, and electricity prices were low. The energy politics under the
‘red-green’ government of that period was, however, far from tranquil
because of the battle between several vested interests. The boost to
renewables (the 2000 EEG) was strongly advocated by manufacturers
and owners of renewable energy (at that time primarily wind) installa-
tions (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Lauber and Mez, 2004) (Section
3.3), whose ranks swelled during the 1990s. This mechanism did not
exist in Japan, because it did not have signiﬁcant renewables industry
in the early 2000s (Table SM-3).
The German nuclear phase-out occurred because the weakened and
fragmented nuclear interests were defeated by competitors including a
strong newcomer (wind) and a politically powerful incumbent (coal).
These anti-nuclear interests acted through a political coalition of the
pro-renewables Greens and pro-coal SPD in the red-green government.
This could not have happened in Japan where a larger and more
cohesive nuclear regime did not have economically and politically
strong competitors. Moreover, the nuclear regime's political inﬂuence
could also be an explanation (additional to security of supply con-
siderations) for increasingly ambitious plans for its expansion under
the 2000s (Kingston, 2013).
Our ﬁndings advance theories connecting political agendas to the
interests of socio-technical regimes (Geels, 2014). We show that the
politics of regime actors is aligned with the structure of their activities,
and may not ﬁt into common analytical and normative categories
(high- vs. low-carbon, renewable vs. fossil, centralized vs. decentra-
lized, incumbents vs. newcomers, conventional vs. alternative). For
example, the concept of the ‘conventional fossil-fuels nuclear regime’
(Strunz, 2014) would not help our analysis. Although some electric
utilities own both thermal and nuclear power stations, most actors in
coal and nuclear technologies had distinctly diﬀerent interests and
political agendas. Although electric utilities often opposed renewables,
companies such as Siemens and Mitsubishi had stakes in both nuclear
and wind power.
The so-called ‘renewables regimes’ deserve an equally careful
analysis. Solar and wind technologies have little in common in so far
as the underlying research, technological development and manufac-
turing is concerned. This is why they did not support each other at the
niche level (Moe, 2011). However, when deployed on a large scale they
may beneﬁt the same actors: property owners, cooperatives, munici-
palities, construction companies. This is, probably, why pro-wind
interests and pro-solar interests were united in advocating for higher
FITs in Germany.
4.4. D. States nurturing niches as a parallel strategy
In pursuing their goals, both states nurtured protected niches
including nuclear power in the 1950s–1960s and renewables from
the 1970s. Their eﬀorts did not guarantee success. Japan's four-decade
long pursuit of solar power through massive RD&D resulted in its
technological leadership but only marginal installations until very
recently. Other niche technologies included in the Sunshine program
– hydrogen, coal-to-liquid, and geothermal (Kurokawa and Ikki, 2001)
– yielded even less results. Germany eventually abandoned its attempts
to commercialize its own wind power technologies in the 1970s-1980s
and Japan failed in a similar eﬀort in the 1990s-2000s.
Precisely because of high risks of failure, states nurtured niches in
parallel, not instead of, working with incumbents. Even successful
eﬀorts would initially result in only modest payoﬀs in terms of
improving secure supply-demand balance. For example, even if
Japan had been as successful as Germany in promoting wind power
in the 1990s it would have covered only about 5% of its demand
increase over that decade (Fig. 8). This is why we observe mechanisms
A and D unfolding in parallel in both countries. Starting from the
1970s, Germany nurtured solar and wind in parallel with providing
massive coal subsidies. For several decades, Japan supported solar
(and eventually wind) while putting the real emphasis on a surer
option: incumbent nuclear power.40
4.5. E. Niches maturing into regimes
When a niche expands, it may become capable of self-reproduction
and competition with other regimes. One example is the rapid
expansion of nuclear power in both countries from a niche in the
1960s to a full-ﬂedged regime in the 1970s. In both countries this
expansion depended not only on state support but also on non-
domestic (US and UK) actors. A similar, although less expected,41
expansion of wind power occurred in Germany in the 1990s with
technology diﬀusing from Denmark. The third niche-regime break-
through involved solar PV in the 2000s, ﬁrst in Germany and then in
Japan.
The evolution of protected niches to formidable regimes has been
extensively documented in the literature. There is, however, not
enough reﬂection on the role of non-domestic actors such as US
Westinghouse or Danish Vestas in these shifts. Proper analysis of such
actors can contribute to the ‘techno-nationalism’ vs. ‘techno-globalism’
debate in the history of technology (Edgerton, 2006).
4.6. Summary
The explanatory mechanisms for the observed diﬀerences and
similarities between Germany and Japan are summarized in Table 4
and further detailed in Tables SM-5 and SM-6.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper explains why the use of nuclear, solar and wind power
has been diﬀerent in Germany and Japan. Responding to Lauber's and
Jacobsson's challenge we propose a framework for analyzing energy
transitions which is “more interdisciplinary than those currently
deployed” (2016, p.161). In line with Turnheim's et al. (2015) concept
of the multiplicity of analytical perspectives on transitions, we consider
political, techno-economic and socio-technical explanations in their
interaction.
We identify ﬁve mechanisms explaining diﬀerent transition epi-
sodes in Germany and Japan (Fig. 7). We show how states’ quest for
secure supply-demand balance shaped both countries’ strategies in the
1970s and the 1980s and aﬀected their diﬀerent commitment to
nuclear power in the 1990s. This quest was pursued in two parallel
strategies: (1) working with incumbent regimes and (2) nurturing
protected niches. Under the ﬁrst strategy, the states strengthened or
weakened incumbent regimes, but could also become manipulated by
these very regimes. Regimes based on domestic resources and on
expanding infrastructure were politically stronger. That is why coal and
wind were stronger in Germany and nuclear was stronger in Japan in
the early 2000s, which explains the boost to renewables and the nuclear
phase-out in Germany but not in Japan. Our analysis shows that
40 Nuclear power both strongly responded to state support and could provide rapid
capacity increase in relatively short time periods (Table SM-4).
41 Jacobsson and Lauber called it an ‘unimaginable’ (2006, p. 264) consequence of a
‘lukewarm’ (Lauber and Mez, 2004, p. 599) policy backed by an ‘unlikely’ (Lauber and
Mez, 2006) broad coalition not speciﬁcally aimed at wind support. Lauber (2004),
Jacobsson and Lauber (2006) and Laird and Stefes (2009) suggest that the German
reuniﬁcation distracted the electric utilities from lobbying against StrEG. This may
partially explain the diﬀerence with Japan in the early 1990s, but not in a longer-term
and not in a wider geographic context.
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political agendas of regimes depend on their material interests and may
not correspond to common analytic and normative categories (such as
low- or high-carbon).
The second strategy, working with niches, makes the state less
vulnerable to the capture by vested interests but it does not guarantee
success. In many cases niche energy technologies did not make it to the
market. When they did, it often involved technology diﬀusion from
other countries, such as nuclear from the US or wind from Denmark.
Such diﬀusion was not predictable or linear: e.g. wind power could
diﬀuse to Germany but not to Japan in the 1990s. In this case
geographic proximity and similarity may be one plausible factor.
Cross-border technology diﬀusion (or across-border regime expansion)
needs further analysis in energy transition studies.
All in all, our analysis shows that transitions in Germany and Japan
comprised distinct change processes, not necessarily abiding by the
same logic. The identiﬁed 5 mechanisms are suﬃciently generic to
explain dozens of transition episodes in Germany and Japan but their
importance vary from one episode to the other. This is in line with
Geels et al. (2016) observation that energy transitions may follow
diﬀerent ‘transition pathways’ at diﬀerent points in time. This does not
mean that more general theories of energy transitions are impossible,
but rather that such theories are unlikely to be useful if they claim to
explain grand 'transformations' encompassing wide ranges of technol-
ogies, countries and periods of time. Instead, a good theory of
contemporary energy transitions is likely to be an assembly of
'micro-logics' of its speciﬁc constituent elements combined with an
understanding of the applicability of such logics to speciﬁc situations
and their relationships to each other. The ﬁve mechanisms identiﬁed in
our analysis are a good starting point for such explanations.
Our ﬁndings also have implications for Japan's and other countries'
prospects of learning from Germany's policy experience. First, we show
that the space for policy choice is often limited. For example, in the
1990s Japan did not have much other choice than to expand its nuclear
energy in response to the electricity demand converging to the levels of
other developed countries. It may be reasonable to assume that
economies with nuclear programs and rapidly rising electricity demand
may not be interested or prepared to copy Germany's nuclear phase-
out policies.
Second, we show that in many other situations, policies targeting
niches did not bring the expected results. For example, support for
wind power in Germany in the 1970s–1980s and in Japan in the
1990s–2000s was not successful. On the other hand, a 'lukewarm'
StrEG (1990) in Germany unexpectedly worked. This means learning
should incorporate not only 'superior policy choices' but also failed
policies as well as unintended outcomes.
Third, we show that some policy choices may have resulted in
dubious compromises. For example, compromising with the coal
industry to achieve the nuclear phase-out in Germany may not be a
desirable solution for some countries or for the global climate, despite
the fact that it resulted in a faster expansion of renewable electricity.
Our analysis shows that it might be especially diﬃcult to refuse
compromise with a domestic fossil fuel sector, which means that
countries with large fossil endowments would ﬁnd it harder to
decarbonize.
Finally, in our view the most problematic aspect of the common
policy learning advice is that it is wrapped in a narrative of coherent
and deliberate 'transformation-inducing' policies. Our study shows that
while in hindsight it is possible to spin a narrative of policy coherence,
in reality policies are more likely to be fragmented and emergent,
responding to speciﬁc challenges rather than aiming to ‘induce
transformations’. To be useful for policy comparison and learning,
the grand narrative of energy transformations should be replaced by
more detailed and cautious accounts of how certain combinations of
economic factors, socio-technical conditions, and policy choices deﬁne
change and continuity in energy systems.
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